File:The Free Press logo.png - Wikipedia

 

How Landslides Renew American Politics

November 13, 2026  | Yuval Levin

The ideological and policy implications of this month’s massive Democratic midterm victory remain far from clear. The public roundly rejected Republicans but still has a very low opinion of Democrats. And since congressional Democrats won’t have the numbers to routinely override presidential vetoes and did not even run on any shared agenda, they aren’t likely to chart any aggressive new direction in governing over the next two years.

But in the long run, it may be the sheer scale and breadth of the Democrats’ win that matters most, and that may signal the dawning of a new phase of American political life.

Either party could plausibly dominate that next phase, or power could continue to swing back and forth. But simply by making large majorities imaginable again, and so focusing political competition on the median voter and the challenge of building broad coalitions, this election could allow for some renewal in our constitutional system.

That Democrats made gains is hardly surprising. Midterms that turn against the president’s party have long been the norm in American politics. But unlike most elections in this century, this one saw a genuinely vast national trend that reached into many unexpected places. Democrats look to be on track to win the largest House and Senate majorities in nearly two decades. Their share of the national popular vote for the House was the largest either party has seen in half a century. And their wins in both houses were remarkably widely distributed: They won Senate seats in Texas, Kansas, Iowa, South Carolina, Mississippi, and perhaps Alaska, and House seats that extended well beyond the usual list of competitive places.

The ideological effects of such a win may not be quite what progressive activists hope. It certainly moves the ideological center of gravity of our national politics to the left some, but it actually moves the internal ideological centers of gravity of both parties to the right. There will now be far fewer blue-state Republicans in Congress, so the congressional GOP will be more conservative on the whole—as was recently foreshadowed by House Republicans’ choice of Representative Jim Jordan to lead them in the coming term. And there will be many more red-state Democrats in both houses, pulling congressional Democrats toward the center. Progressives who spent the past two years frustrated with Pennsylvania senator John Fetterman for questioning the party line are likely to find that new Democratic senators from deep-red states are even less inclined to defund Immigration and Customs Enforcement or tolerate socialism.

To maintain some of the more surprising seats they’ve won, and even just to work with the new members elected from those places, Democrats will need to temper their more controversial excesses. Meanwhile, Republicans will have to think about winning those seats back, which will require them to focus more on persuadable voters than on their own devoted base and activists.

This has always been the peculiar logic of America’s two-party system. Winning big and losing big both tend to create incentives for thinking in terms of coalitions and prioritizing persuadable voters. In contrast, long stretches of close elections—like the run we’ve experienced with remarkably few interruptions since 2000—send our politics toward the margins by convincing the parties that pure mobilization is the only way to prevail, and that only narrow wins are possible.

Those two assumptions reinforce each other and become self-fulfilling prophecies. When you think you can win only by getting every last devoted partisan to the ballot box, you offer an agenda suited to your base and turn off voters who might go either way. That tends to mean you win or lose by just a hair, so you never really learn much about what persuadable voters want, and grow further obsessed with mobilization and fan service. Both parties have been locked in this vicious cycle for a quarter century, leaving America in what my colleague Ruy Teixeira and I have called a “politics without winners.”

Other problems also grow worse amid deadlock. Gerrymandering, money in politics, and even election interference really only matter at the margins of extremely close elections. As we learned this month, they can all get washed away when one party wins big enough.

Our party politics works this way because there is often an inverse relationship between local and national deadlock in our system: When most places aren’t competitive, and one party or another can always assume it will win them easily, then our national politics optimizes around that rigid geographic pattern and falls into a 50-50 deadlock. But when lots of places are locally competitive, large national majorities become more achievable for both parties. When Texas or New York might go either way, then national blowouts become imaginable.

Here, too, there is a set of reinforcing dynamics. If Republicans can’t take Texas for granted and have to defend themselves there by making sure they don’t offend swing voters, they will end up also looking more attractive to more voters in New York. If Democrats then have to worry about swing voters in New York, they will have more of a chance of winning in Texas again.

Winning big makes governing effectively a little more achievable, too. Larger majorities have more room to maneuver and advance legislation. Increasing the internal diversity of the parties can also encourage the kinds of strange-bedfellow coalitions our politics depends upon. And a politics better oriented to the desires of the median voter than of radical activists of either party is more likely to be responsive to changing public priorities and novel issues.

Note that the median voter may not be quite who either party’s elites imagine. Persuadable voters near the middle are not fiscally moderate social liberals. They are closer to the opposite of that: culturally conservative and economically progressive. In fact, in ideological terms, the median voter is probably a lot like President Donald Trump. In that sense, the GOP is well positioned for an era of large majorities. On almost every issue—from the role of government to gay rights, entitlement spending, and in some respects even immigration and trade—the party is closer to the median voter today than it was 15 years ago, and closer than the Democrats are, too.

It is Trump’s thuggish abuses of power, mercurial and ineffectual governing style, and profound character failings, all enabled by the broader GOP, that have rendered the party deeply unpopular. Regaining voters’ trust won’t be easy, but it first requires distancing the party from Trump, which many Republican politicians are clearly eager to start doing.

Democrats actually have a far greater ideological distance to travel to position their party to appeal to that median voter. But they may at last have strong incentives to take on that work, since they now see that such voters are reachable all over the country and have experienced what a genuinely expansive victory can feel like. They also have many new seats to defend that will require them to be willing to frustrate their activists.

All of this may end up pulling us out of our dismal era of deadlock. But that is not yet clear. Some portion of the Democrats’ gains in this election was a function of depressed voter turnout among Republicans. The 2028 presidential election may show us that places that seemed newly competitive really aren’t, so we are still stuck in a tie at the national level.

It may also turn out that renewed incentives for building broad coalitions are overwhelmed by the logic of the primary system, and activists in both parties still hold all the cards. Nonetheless, for the first time in at least 15 years, there are serious reasons to think that big wins and broad majorities could become possible again.

That would ultimately be good news for both parties. Neither side of our politics makes durable gains in long stretches of 50-50 elections, while both can chalk up some genuine if partial policy wins when real majorities are possible. So wherever you stand politically, unless your goal is only to frustrate the other party, the prospect of breaking the deadlock should give you some hope that our system of government could gradually revitalize its capacity to facilitate meaningful policy negotiation and finally take on some of the complicated challenges that confront our society.